The impact of iceberg orders in limit order books by Frey, Stefan & Sandås, Patrik
econstor
www.econstor.eu
Der Open-Access-Publikationsserver der ZBW – Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
The Open Access Publication Server of the ZBW – Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Die ZBW räumt Ihnen als Nutzerin/Nutzer das unentgeltliche,
räumlich unbeschränkte und zeitlich auf die Dauer des Schutzrechts
beschränkte einfache Recht ein, das ausgewählte Werk im Rahmen
der unter
→  http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
nachzulesenden vollständigen Nutzungsbedingungen zu
vervielfältigen, mit denen die Nutzerin/der Nutzer sich durch die
erste Nutzung einverstanden erklärt.
Terms of use:
The ZBW grants you, the user, the non-exclusive right to use
the selected work free of charge, territorially unrestricted and
within the time limit of the term of the property rights according
to the terms specified at
→  http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
By the first use of the selected work the user agrees and
declares to comply with these terms of use.
zbw
Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
Frey, Stefan; Sandås, Patrik
Working Paper
The impact of iceberg orders in limit
order books
CFR working paper, No. 09-06
Provided in cooperation with:
Universität zu Köln
Suggested citation: Frey, Stefan; Sandås, Patrik (2009) : The impact of iceberg orders in limit
order books, CFR working paper, No. 09-06, http://hdl.handle.net/10419/41392 
 
CFR-Working Paper NO. 09-06 
 
 
The Impact of 
Iceberg Orders 





S. Frey • P. Sandas The Impact of Iceberg Orders in Limit Order Books ∗
Stefan Frey† Patrik Sand˚ as‡
Current Draft: May 17, 2009
First Draft: September 2007
∗We thank Mark Van Achter, Bruno Biais, Burton Holliﬁeld, Uday Rajan, Gideon Saar, Christer
Wennerberg, and Gunther Wuyts and seminar participants at the 2009 AFA meetings, the 4th
Annual Central Bank Workshop on the Microstructure of Financial Markets, Center for Financial
Research, CFTC, Nasdaq OMX, NBER Market Microstructure Meetings, the Center for Financial
Studies’ Conference on the Industrial Organization of Securities Markets, the Oxford-Man Institute,
University of Bonn, and the Society for Financial Econometrics’s Inaugural Conference for many
helpful suggestions, the German Stock Exchange for providing access to the Xetra order book data
and Uwe Schweickert for his help with the order book reconstruction. Frey gratefully acknowledges
ﬁnancial support from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, and Sand˚ as gratefully acknowledges
ﬁnancial support from the McIntire School of Commerce and the Institute for Financial Research
(SIFR).
†University of T¨ ubingen and Center for Financial Research, stefan.frey@uni-tuebingen.de
‡University of Virginia, McIntire School of Commerce, patriks@virginia.eduAbstract
We examine the impact of iceberg orders on the price and order ﬂow dynamics in limit order
books. Iceberg orders allow traders to simultaneously hide a large portion of their order size
and signal their interest in trading to the market. We show that when the market learns
about iceberg orders they tend to strongly attract market orders consistent with iceberg
orders facilitating the search for latent liquidity. The greater the fraction of an iceberg order
that is executed the smaller its price impact consistent with liquidity rather than informed
trading. The presence of iceberg orders is associated with increased trading consistent with
a positive liquidity externality, but the reduced order book transparency associated with
iceberg orders also creates an adverse selection cost for limit orders that may partly oﬀset
any gains.
Keywords: Hidden Liquidity; Iceberg Orders; Limit Order Markets; Transparency;
JEL Codes: G10, G14A trader seeking to execute a large trade faces the problem that signalling his trading
intentions to the market can both help and hurt the eﬀective execution of his trade. A signal
may help attract counterparties to reduce the time it takes to complete the trade and the
trading cost. On the other hand, it may also attract opportunistic traders who make the
completion less likely or more costly. Traders’ solutions may include following dynamic order
submission strategies or trading oﬀ the exchange because such strategies limit the amount
of information that is revealed about their trading intentions. Many exchanges have oﬀered
their own solution by adopting a particular order type known as an iceberg order. We study
the use of iceberg orders and their impact on price and order ﬂow dynamics in limit order
books. We ﬁnd evidence that supports the view that iceberg orders allow traders to advertise
their trading intentions and attract counterparties while limiting the expected price impact
of their trades. Our evidence is consistent with iceberg orders attracting market orders that
may otherwise have stayed on the sidelines. On the other hand, we also show that some of
these gains come at the expense of limit orders who suﬀer an adverse selection cost due to
the reduced order book transparency.
A trader submitting an iceberg order speciﬁes a price, a total order size, and a peak (size)
which is smaller than the total size. Initially only the peak is displayed in the order book and
the rest of the order remains hidden. When the ﬁrst peak has been fully executed, another
peak is automatically displayed in the order book, and the hidden part is reduced by the
corresponding number of shares.
Our understanding of the rationale for submitting iceberg orders and the desirability of
market designs that allow such orders is still incomplete. The iceberg orders have a direct
eﬀect on order books, but, perhaps more interesting, is the indirect eﬀect that they are likely
to have on the strategic behavior of other market participants. To what extent can market
participants detect the presence and predict the amount of hidden volume? If they can
then what is the rationale for submitting iceberg orders? Are iceberg submitters motivated
1primarily by liquidity or information? What is the impact of iceberg orders on liquidity
suppliers who use limit orders? We address these questions using a sample from the German
Stock Exchange’s Xetra platform that includes detailed information on iceberg orders.
In order to address these questions we need some way to approximate the information
that market participants have about the existence and size of potential iceberg orders. The
immediate automatic display of a new peak after the currently displayed peak is executed
creates a distinct pattern in the order book updates that is observable to any market par-
ticipant who monitors the order book closely. A market participant who detects an iceberg
order cannot determine the iceberg order’s size although its peak size may provide a signal.
But as peaks are executed and new ones are displayed the participant can form more precise
forecasts of the order’s original size. Rather than disclose the information about the order
size right away the iceberg order sequentially reveals more information as peaks are executed.
Building on these observations, we develop an algorithm for detecting iceberg orders that
uses publicly available information on the order book and price dynamics. Conditional on
a signal of detection, we use the observed peak size and the number of executed peaks to
dynamically predict the hidden volume. We combine the detection algorithm’s signals of
icebergs with our actual iceberg observations to isolate the iceberg order’s impact on the
behavior of market participants from other factors that may inﬂuence the propensity to
submit iceberg orders. Our sample exhibits a lot of variation in the peak sizes, the number
of submitted peaks, and the number of executed peaks which implies that our methodology
generates independent variation in the executed iceberg volume and the predicted hidden
volume.
We are interested in the price impact of iceberg orders because they tend to be much
larger than regular limit orders and hence they are likely to move prices for either liquidity or
information reasons. Yet, several studies conclude that iceberg order have little price impact.
We show that iceberg orders have a price impact that is increasing in their order size. But the
2observed price impact of an iceberg order of a given size depends critically on the fraction of
the iceberg order that is eventually executed. Together this evidence supports the liquidity-
based explanation. If the primary driver was information we would, on average, expect to
observe a price movement in the direction of the iceberg orders regardless of how much of it
was executed. Instead the observed pattern supports the view that it is the initially unknown
latent liquidity demand, which eventually is discovered, that together with the iceberg order
determine the price impact.
We examine how iceberg orders inﬂuence the order ﬂow to better understand the potential
dual objectives of hiding and signalling. We show that the detection status of an iceberg
order, the predicted hidden volume, and the amount of iceberg volume already executed
inﬂuence the likelihood and size of market orders. We ﬁnd that detected iceberg orders are
more likely to attract market orders that undetected iceberg orders; that the market order
size is increasing in the iceberg order’s size; and that the probability of additional market
orders hitting the iceberg order is increasing in the iceberg volume that has already been
executed.
Given that the iceberg orders appear to allow some traders to more eﬀectively execute
their transactions it is natural to ask if the beneﬁt to this group of traders comes at the
expense of some other traders. If we focus strictly on the trade executions then trading is a
zero-sum game with the proﬁts to liquidity suppliers corresponding to the transaction costs
paid by the liquidity demanders. We measure the proﬁts earned by liquidity suppliers using
either iceberg or limit orders to assess the net eﬀect for order books with iceberg orders. Our
results show that iceberg orders are more proﬁtable when they are either undetected or when
the market underestimates their true size. This is consistent with the strategic advantage
of iceberg orders coming from the submitter’s ability to control the amount of information
reveled. In aggregate, limit orders earn a proﬁt in order books with no iceberg orders but
suﬀer a loss in order books with iceberg orders. The losses partly stem from the fact that
3an iceberg order has a price impact which will, on average, cause limit orders on the wrong
side to suﬀer losses. In addition, there is a ‘crowding out’ eﬀect in that iceberg orders are
large and eﬀectively drive down the execution probability for limit orders on the ‘right side’
of the order book but behind the iceberg order.
A number of empirical studies including Boni and Leach (2004), Degryse (1999), Flem-
ing and Mizrach (2008), Labys (2001), Pardo and Pascual (2007), and Tuttle (2006) docu-
ment widespread use of iceberg orders or closely related order types such as reserve orders.
Other studies including Aitken, Berkman, and Mak (2001), Harris (1996), Bessembinder,
Panayides, and Venkataraman (2009) study the decision to submit iceberg orders. Theoreti-
cal treatments of iceberg orders include Buti and Rindi (2008), Esser and M¨ onch (2007) and
Moinas (2007). The studies most closely related to ours are De Winne and D‘Hondt (2007)
and Bessembinder, Panayides, and Venkataraman (2009). Our approach to the iceberg order
detection builds on their work and extends it by incorporating both the peak size and the
number of executed peaks. Bessembinder, Panayides, and Venkataraman (2009) apply the
implementation shortfall methodology to assess the costs and beneﬁts of submitting iceberg
orders. We focus instead on the impact of the iceberg orders on the behavior of other market
participants and their payoﬀs. Our methodology allow us to extend the analysis of De Winne
and D‘Hondt (2007) who do not use the peak size, the number of executed peaks, nor control
for variables the may inﬂuence the propensity to submit iceberg orders.
Our evidence on the information content of the iceberg orders for future mid-quotes adds
to the growing literature that investigates the information content of the limit order book.
Cao, Hansch, and Wang (2009) ﬁnd that future prices to some extent can be predicted based
on visible information in the order book and an experimental study by Bloomﬁeld, O’Hara,
and Saar (2005) shows that informed traders may often use limit orders providing a rational
for an informative limit order book. Our evidence shows that other order book information
including the hidden volume from iceberg orders and the history of order book updates also
4helps predict both future prices and quantities.
In the next section we develop our testable hypotheses. In Section 2 we present our
sample and our methodology. In Section 3 we present our main empirical results for the
price impact, the market order ﬂow, and the order book proﬁts. Section 4 provides some
further interpretation of our results. Section 5 concludes. In the Appendix we provide more
details on the computation of proﬁts to liquidity suppliers, the detection algorithm, and
estimation procedures.
1 Testable Hypotheses
In this section we develop and present our hypotheses for the iceberg orders impact on prices,
the market order ﬂow, and the order book proﬁts of liquidity suppliers. An iceberg order
speciﬁes a price, a total size, and a peak size. The peak size is the maximum displayed
volume. When a trader submits an iceberg order, the ﬁrst peak size is displayed in the
order book. At that time, the hidden volume of the order is equal to the order’s total
size minus its peak size. When the ﬁrst peak size has been fully executed, another peak
(size) is automatically displayed in the order book, and the hidden volume is reduced by the
corresponding number of shares. The trading system automatically displays new peaks after
additional executions until the ﬁnal peak is displayed or the submitter cancels the iceberg
order.
Initially an iceberg order is indistinguishable from a limit order with the same price
and size. But over time the execution of displayed peaks and the display of new peaks
allow market participants to learn about its existence and predict its size. In addition, any
systematic relationship between the peak size, the number of peaks, and the iceberg order’s
total size imply that market participants can improve their forecasts of the iceberg order’s
size over time.
5Iceberg orders are often justiﬁed and promoted as an order type that facilitates the
execution of large orders with minimal price impact, a property that should appeal to large
liquidity traders. On the other hand, the more successful iceberg orders are in reducing
the price impact for large orders the more they should appeal to informed traders. The
existing evidence on the price impact of iceberg orders is mixed. A challenge in addressing
the price impact question is that the iceberg order’s price is ﬁxed for each peak causing the
short-term impact to be zero regardless of the order’s ultimate impact. We focus on the
price impact measured over a horizon that is longer than the duration of the iceberg order
to overcome this challenge. The ﬁxed iceberg order price also means that the full impact
of public information, which is revealed while the iceberg order is outstanding, may only be
reﬂected in prices with a delay.
The ability to hide a large portion of the order size may make iceberg orders appealing
to informed traders. We would therefore expect iceberg orders to have a price impact and
we would expect the price impact to be increasing in the iceberg order’s size. Iceberg orders
may also have a price impact if they are primarily submitted by large liquidity traders. The
diﬀerence is that if the iceberg orders are primarily submitted by liquidity traders then we
would expect the net price impact to depend on the latent demand for liquidity. Consider
a buy iceberg order of a given size. If the order is primarily submitted by liquidity traders,
we would expect the price impact to depend on the latent liquidity demand; lots of interest
in selling may imply that the net impact of the buy iceberg order is small, little interest in
selling produces a greater price impact. In contrast, if positive information is the reason for
submitting the buy iceberg order, we would expect a higher future mid-quote regardless of
the market order ﬂow. To distinguish between these scenarios we consider the following two
hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: Price Impact The future mid-quote is increasing in the expected and
actual size of a buy iceberg order and decreasing in the expected and actual size of a sell
6iceberg order.
Hypothesis 2: Price Impact-Liquidity. For a given expected or actual size of an
iceberg order, the future mid-quote is decreasing in the executed volume of a buy iceberg order
and increasing in the executed volume of a sell iceberg order.
The expected fraction of the iceberg order that executes depends on the interaction be-
tween the iceberg order and the market order ﬂow. A challenge in sorting out the interaction
is that the iceberg order submissions may be opportunistically timed. For example, a trader
may submit a buy iceberg order when the probability of a sell market order is high or the
expected size of sell market orders is large or some combination of the two.1 On the other
hand, since the iceberg order can be detected by liquidity demanders and its peak size may
act as a signal about its size, it is also possible that the iceberg order itself induces a change
in the market order ﬂow. For example, some liquidity demanders may wait until they detect
an iceberg order on the other side of the market because they rather trade when there is
greater depth on the other side of the market. The timing argument leads to the following
hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3: Timing. An iceberg order on the bid side is associated with a greater
likelihood of sell market orders and larger sell market orders, holding other things equal, with
the corresponding prediction for iceberg orders on the ask side and buy market orders.
By timing the iceberg order submission the submitter increases the likelihood of ﬁlling
the order. It also possible that potential counterparties react to signal of an iceberg order
and perhaps react more strongly depending on the size of the iceberg order. The fact that
iceberg orders are detectable makes signalling possible, and as long as there is some latent
liquidity demand, there are potential counterparties who may react to the signal. The fact
that the iceberg submitter could have stayed out of the order book and either submitted a
1The results on the order aggressiveness in De Winne and D‘Hondt (2007) illustrate this point. They ﬁnd
that a signal of an iceberg order increases the order aggressiveness, but the results are also consistent with
the reverse explanation that the iceberg order was submitted in anticipation of greater order aggressiveness.
7series of smaller limit orders or waited for suitable limit order to appear in the order book
implies that she chose to follow a strategy that potentially reveals more information than
some alternative strategies. Regardless of the intent we may have an eﬀect that can be
thought of as a signaling or advertising eﬀect of the iceberg order. This leads us to our
fourth hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4: Advertising Eﬀect. A detected iceberg order on the bid side increases
the likelihood of a sell market order and increases the expected size of sell market orders.
Analogous predictions apply to the ask side of the order book and buy market orders.
Despite the fact that market participants may detect and react to iceberg orders, they
clearly have less information and hence are subject to potential adverse selection. Liquidity
demanders are exposed to the risk of trading with an iceberg order that turns out to be
larger than expected. Conversely, liquidity demanders fare better if they trade with an
iceberg order that turned out to be smaller than expected. So here the active side of the
trade is exposed to an adverse selection risk that is similar to the one faced by the passive
side in the Glosten (1994) model.
Liquidity suppliers who submit limit orders may suﬀer losses for the following reason.
Any limit order behind the iceberg order in the order queue is very unlikely to be executed
whereas limit orders on the other side are relatively more likely to be executed. If the iceberg
order tends to move the prices, this means that limit orders are more likely to receive more
unfavorable executions and less likely to received favorable executions. Like the risk for
liquidity demanders this risk is more severe when the iceberg order is a surprise or when it
is turns out to be larger than anticipated.
Hypothesis 5: Adverse Selection. Iceberg orders create an adverse selection risk for
both liquidity demanders and suppliers. The risk is more severe when the iceberg order has
not been detected or when it is larger than expected based on available information.
82 Our Sample and Methodology
2.1 Our Sample
Our sample is from Deutsche B¨ orse’s electronic trading platform Xetra. It covers all thirty
stocks in the DAX-30 German blue chip index for the period January 2nd to March 31st,
2004. On Xetra, traders can, in addition to market and limit orders, submit iceberg orders.
The order records identify iceberg orders so that we are able to reconstruct snapshots of
both the displayed and hidden order books. We restrict our sample to continuous trading
only. We present more details on the sample reconstruction in Appendix A4.
In the order book, an order is given priority according to price, display condition, and
time. A sell order at a lower price has priority relative to any sell orders at higher prices,
regardless of the order’s time of submission or display condition. At the same price level, a
displayed order has priority relative to any hidden orders regardless of the order’s time of
submission. Among displayed orders, an order submitted earlier has priority relative to any
orders submitted later. When an iceberg order’s displayed part is fully executed and the
next peak converts from hidden to displayed status the newly displayed peak also receives a
new time stamp which determines its time priority.
2.1.1 Iceberg Submissions
For the purpose of brevity we sort the stocks into three categories—large, medium, and
small—based on trading activity and report all results for these three categories only. The
large and medium categories have eight and seven stocks, respectively, with the remain-
ing ﬁfteen stocks being assigned to the small category. Table A1 in the appendix reports
descriptive statistics for all thirty sample stocks.
Table I reports cross-sectional descriptive statistics for iceberg and limits orders with
cross-sectional standard deviations in parentheses. Panel A shows that the iceberg orders’
9share of all non-marketable orders submitted ranges from 7 to 11% with an overall average
of 9%. Iceberg orders represent a greater fraction of shares executed with the corresponding




median distance between the order price and the best quote for iceberg orders and limit
orders. The diﬀerences between iceberg and limit orders in the order price dimension appear
to be small and unsystematic.
Panel C reports averages of the iceberg order’s total size, peak size, the number of
submitted peaks, and the number of executed peaks of iceberg orders whose ﬁrst peak size
was executed. The last row of the panel reports the average size of limit orders. Iceberg
orders are on average 12 to 20 times larger than limit orders demonstrating that iceberg
orders tend to be an order of magnitude larger than limit orders. Even the peak size is
between 2.2 and 2.9 times larger, which further underscores the diﬀerence between iceberg
orders and limit orders in order size.
The number of peaks is negatively correlated with the peak size since the product of their
averages exceeds the average total size. We explore the relationship between peak size and
the number of peaks in more detail below. The average number of executed peaks shows that
conditional on the ﬁrst peak being executed, on average, four new peaks will be displayed
and approximately 80% of the executed shares originate from initially hidden volume for
these orders.
Panel D reports statistics on the clustering of the total size, peak size, and the number
of peaks. We report the percentage of all observations that are accounted for by the three
most frequently observed values to illustrate the degree of clustering. The clustering is
strongest for the peak size with 59% of all observed peak size values accounted for by the
three most frequently observed values for a typical stock. The number of peaks is somewhat
less clustered with a corresponding average frequency of 34%.
102.1.2 Iceberg Executions
Table II reports statistics on several dimensions of the iceberg execution. The ﬁrst speciﬁ-
cation in Panel A is a regression of the realized proﬁt for iceberg orders, with at least one
executed peak, on the total order size, the executed volume, and the peak size. We normalize
all variables so that the intercept captures the average realized spread for a typical iceberg




price and the mid-quote 30 minutes after the iceberg’s last peak was executed. On average,
the per share realized proﬁt is positive, and signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero, starting at
1.7 basis points for the large and increasing to 3.7 basis points for the small stock group.
The second speciﬁcation includes both the total order size and the executed volume and
this combination reveals an interesting regularity. Holding the executed volume constant,
a larger iceberg order has a higher realized spread suggesting that the hidden size matters for
the future mid-quote even though it may never be directly observed by market participants.
The eﬀect of the iceberg’s peak size is more mixed with many stocks having a negative
coeﬃcient albeit not always signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. The importance of the order size
is evidence that the ability to hide the order size creates a strategic advantage. Conversely,
it explains why other market participants may expend resources trying to detect iceberg
orders and predict their total size.
Prior to the execution of its ﬁrst peak the iceberg order resembles a limit order. To
take into account the possible diﬀerence between the ﬁrst and subsequent peaks we estimate
models for both the probability of execution for the ﬁrst peak and the execution percentage
conditional on the ﬁrst peak being executed. Panel B and C report the marginal eﬀects for
the two execution statistics. The negative marginal eﬀect of the peak size for the execution
probability is consistent with a larger peak size encouraging undercutting and hence reducing
the probability of execution. On the other hand, Panel C shows that, conditional on one
peak being executed, a larger peak size increases the percentage executed. Once a peak has
11been executed, the iceberg order is likely to have been detected and at that stage a larger
peak size facilitates a greater execution percentage because each added peak represents a
larger fraction of the total order and minimize the opportunities for limit orders to gain
priority by matching the price of the iceberg order. Both of these eﬀects are consistent with
the assumptions made regarding the peak size in Esser and M¨ onch (2007).
The distance to the best quote has, as expected, a large negative eﬀect on the probability
of execution, but conditional on an executed peak the initial distance to the best quote
is no longer useful for predicting the percentage executed. The order size has a positive
marginal eﬀect for the probability of execution which is interesting since it is hidden. One
interpretation is that traders submitting larger iceberg orders are more patient and therefore
more likely to received at least one execution. The same variable has a negative marginal
eﬀect on the percentage executed, which is expected as, everything else equal, it is more
diﬃcult to ﬁll a larger order.
2.2 Methodology
Our methodology consists of an algorithm for detecting iceberg orders and a model for pre-
dicting the hidden volume. The goal is to approximate the market participants’ information
set with respect to iceberg orders and hidden volume and to relate innovations in their in-
formation set to subsequent price and order ﬂow dynamics. We presents each part of our
methodology in more detail below.
The detection algorithm solves a problem that is similar to the one solved by researchers
with limit order book datasets that lack the complete information on iceberg orders. For
example, Biais, Hillion, and Spatt (1995) apply a method to determine that one trade out
of eight is partially executed against an iceberg order using only information available to
anyone observing the order book. De Winne and D‘Hondt (2007) develop an algorithm
similar to the one we use and apply to a dataset that includes iceberg order information.
12Bessembinder, Panayides, and Venkataraman (2009) show for a related dataset how other
publicly observed variables can be used to generate informative predictions about iceberg
orders even before any executions have occurred. We extend this line of inquiry by exploiting
both information from both detected and undetected iceberg orders in our analysis. There
is no priori work that we are aware of that generates dynamic predictions for hidden volume.
2.2.1 Detecting Iceberg Orders
A detection algorithm is a set of rules for generating predictions of whether or not a given
order book contains iceberg orders based on publicly available data. The basic idea is that
if an order book contains an iceberg at the best quote then a trade that exhausts all the
displayed depth at the best quote prompts an immediate addition of new depth equal to the
iceberg order’s peak size. Following such an event the algorithm sets the indicator for an
iceberg to one and based on the amount of added depth the algorithm will anticipate future
depth changes for as long as the iceberg order remains in the order book. The algorithm
remembers the indicator values for multiple prices so if the current best quote, which has a
detected iceberg, is undercut but later becomes the best quote again the algorithm assumes
that the iceberg order is still there until an anticipated update to the order book depth
fails to occur. We provide a detailed example that illustrates how our algorithm works in
Appendix A3.
Table III reports the average frequencies of the iceberg signals generated by the algo-




results for the best quote only. The frequencies reported in the table are the cross-sectional
averages with cross-sectional standard errors reported in parentheses. The diagonal entries
are the percentages of correct predictions; for 85 to 90% of the observations the algorithm
correctly detects no iceberg order, and for 6 to 9% of the observations the algorithm correctly
detects an iceberg. The top right entry in each panel is the percentage of observations for
13which the algorithm falsely detects an iceberg. These instances are relatively rare with the
average frequency being around 1%. The bottom left entry in each panel is the percentage
of observations for which the algorithm fails to detect an iceberg order. Between 3 and 5%
of the observations fall in this category. The algorithm’s relative weakness is the instances
of iceberg orders that it fails to detect. These percentages suggest that iceberg orders may
succeed in remaining hidden, albeit only for a limited amount of time.
The frequencies reported in Table III are for the ask side only. The results for the bid side
are very similar. Furthermore, the correlation between icebergs on the bid and the ask side
is low so the frequency of an iceberg signal for at least one side of the book is approximately
twice the percentages in the bottom right of each panel.
It is diﬃcult to determine how closely the predictions from our algorithm approximates
the market participants’ information about iceberg orders. Conversations with market par-
ticipants suggest that it is reasonable to assume that active participants are able to discern
this type of information from observing the order book dynamics or by using their own al-
gorithms. It may also be the case that some market participants can generate even more
accurate predictions using other signals.
2.2.2 Predicting Hidden Volume
Figure 1 shows a mosaic plot of the peak size and the total size for one representative stock
(ticker: DPW). The widths of the boxes is proportional to the frequencies of the diﬀerent peak
size categories. Similarly the height of the resulting boxes is proportional to the frequencies




minus signs indicate the strength of the deviation from the null hypothesis of independence.
The plot shows that the peak size and the total size are positively correlated although the
total size is non-linear in the peak size and exhibits some discontinuities. For example, for
both the 1K and 2K peak size category, the total size that is unusually frequent is 10K. On
14the other hand, if we compare the smallest and the largest category of peak sizes, 1K versus
10K, we see that the total size categories do not overlap much with most of the distribution
shifted to either 20K or 50K for the largest peak sizes. We observe some cross-sectional
variation but all stocks exhibit both a general positive correlation between peak size and
total size with some deviations that may reﬂect clustering on certain round numbers or a
deliberate choice by the iceberg order submitters.
Market participants do not observe all the information in Figure 1, but they can identify
the peak size and track the number of peaks executed for detected iceberg orders. We
assume that market participants form rational expectations about the hidden volume based




at the best quote, conditional on an iceberg signal, using the peak size and the number of
executed peaks. We report average parameter estimates and standard errors for a linear and
a piecewise-linear speciﬁcation. In both speciﬁcations the hidden volume and the peak size
are normalized by the average peak size for each stock.
Regardless of the speciﬁcation the predicted hidden volume is positive correlated with
the peak size of the detected iceberg, and each executed peak reduces the predicted hidden




Figure 2 shows the observed average hidden volume as a function of the number of
executed peaks for one of the sample stocks, DPW, and the four most commonly observed
peak size categories. The average ﬁtted values for the piecewise linear speciﬁcation is plotted
with a solid line in the graph. The hidden size has been normalized by the average peak size
for each stock. The relationship between hidden volume and the number of executed peaks
is, in general, negative, as expected, with a slope that is less than one; for each executed
peak the expected hidden volume declines by less than one peak. We observe distinct jumps
for all three stocks between four and ﬁve and between nine and ten executed peaks.
153 Empirical Results
We start by presenting our results for the impact of iceberg orders on future prices and the
market order ﬂow. We then present our results for the iceberg orders’ impact on order book
proﬁts.





Table V reports results for regressions with the mid-quote change as the dependent variable
and iceberg and hidden volume among the independent variables. We measure the mid-
quote change over a thirty trade horizon that starts from the current trade. The ﬁrst six
rows of the table (above the dashed line) report parameter estimates with standard errors
that capture a standard price impact of market orders which includes an intercept, a ﬁxed
parameter on the sign of the trade, and a trade-size dependent parameter. The parameter
estimates for the ﬁxed parameter are between two and three basis points and the parameter
estimates for the trade-size dependent parameter are between one-half and one basis points.
In speciﬁcation A we add two iceberg related variables to determine to what extent
iceberg orders have any impact. The ﬁrst is a signed indicator for a detected iceberg order;
the indicator is positive for a buy iceberg and negative for a sell iceberg order. A positive
coeﬃcient on the indicator implies that the mid-quote tends to shift in the direction of
the iceberg order. The second iceberg variable interacts the signed market order size with
an unsigned indicator for a detected iceberg. The coeﬃcient on this variable captures any
diﬀerential price impact of market order size with iceberg orders in the book.
The parameter estimates on the signed iceberg indicator are positive and signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero for all three categories implying that, holding other things equal, the mid-
quote tends to increase over the next 30 trades, if there is an iceberg at the bid side at time t
and conversely decrease, if there is an iceberg at the ask side. The coeﬃcient on the iceberg
16indicator interacted with the signed market order size is negative for all categories and ranges
from -0.2 to -0.3 basis points implying that the per unit price impact is approximately 30%
smaller when there is an iceberg order in the order book; both the future mid-quote and the
per unit price impact is diﬀerent for order books with detected iceberg orders. Overall, the
evidence suggests that the price impact is both statistically and economically diﬀerent when
iceberg orders have been detected.
In speciﬁcation B we add the executed iceberg volume and predicted hidden volume. The
executed iceberg volume is deﬁned as the sum of all shares executed that originated from
the iceberg order in the current iceberg sequence. The predicted hidden volume is obtained
from the ﬁtted values of the piecewise-linear speciﬁcation in section 2.2.2. Both the executed
iceberg volume and the predicted hidden volume are signed and normalized by the average
market order size.
The positive parameters on the predicted hidden volume imply that, holding other things
equal, greater expected hidden volume on the bid side is associated with a higher future
price. The mean predicted hidden volume across the categories is between 7 and 10 units
and produce a price impact that range from one to three basis points. A one standard
deviation shock to the predicted hidden volume—which is between 3 and 5 units—translates
into a change of between 0.5 to 1.5 basis points.
The estimated parameters on the executed iceberg volume are negative and range from
-0.07 to -0.16 basis points. Across the three categories the mean value of the executed volume
is between 7 and 9 units which translates into an average adjustment of between -0.5 to -
1.4 basis points. A one standard deviation shock to the executed iceberg volume—which is
between 7 and 10 units—increase the magnitude of the adjustment to between -1.3 and -3
basis points. The evidence of the price impact being increasing in the order size is consistent
with Hypothesis 1. The fact that the net price impact decreases, holding other things equal,
in the executed iceberg volume supports the liquidity-based explanation of Hypothesis 2.
17Speciﬁcation C adds the ‘surprise’ in the hidden volume deﬁned as the diﬀerence between
the actual hidden volume and the predicted hidden volume. If market participants under-
estimate the amount of hidden volume, we expect the diﬀerence to eventually be reﬂected
in prices either by market participants learning the truth as more peaks are displayed or
indirectly through future order ﬂow. In either case we would expect a greater than expected
hidden volume on the bid side to predict a higher mid-quote and vice versa according to
Hypothesis 1. The estimated parameter on the actual minus predicted hidden volume is be-
tween 0.15 and 0.36 basis points per unit and provides additional support for the hypothesis.
A shock equal to one standard deviation of the surprise hidden volume, which has a mean of
zero, is approximately equal to 8 units and that shock translates into an expected mid-quote
adjustment of one to three basis points.
Speciﬁcation D replaces the predicted hidden volume with the actual hidden volume to
determine the importance of measurement errors from the prediction exercise. As expected
the increased precision raises the estimated parameters on the actual hidden volume com-
pared to those of the predicted hidden volume and reduces the parameters on the signed
iceberg indicator. The estimated parameters on executed volume are nearly unchanged.
Overall, the results show that iceberg orders have an impact on prices, but the magnitude
of the impact depends critically on the realization of the net liquidity demand. If a large
fraction of the iceberg order is executed, it implies a smaller net liquidity demand shock—the
demand from the iceberg was largely met by latent demand on the other side—resulting in
a smaller price change. On the other hand, if there are few executions relative to the size of
the iceberg order then we have a large net liquidity demand shock which generates a larger
price changes which is increasing in the iceberg order’s size. The fact that the impact of an
iceberg order, holding its size constant, depends on the order ﬂow realization suggests that
the impact is more about the discovery of the net balance of liquidity demand than about
trading on private information. If the primary reason for submitting the iceberg order was
18private information we would, on average, expect a price change that increases in its size
but that is independent of the order ﬂow realization.





Table VI reports results for the market order size regressed on four indicators for detected
and not detected iceberg orders, visible volume, executed iceberg volume, and predicted
hidden volume. For all variables we distinguish between the eﬀect on the side of the order
book that is hit by the market order and the side that is not hit.
The estimated coeﬃcients for the iceberg indicators are all positive and signiﬁcantly dif-
ferent from zero implying that market order size and iceberg orders are positively correlated.
The estimated parameters for market orders hitting detected icebergs are approximately 0.4
for speciﬁcation A implying that the average market order size increases by approximately
40% when an iceberg has been detected iceberg. But, the magnitude of the parameter esti-
mates for the corresponding not detected iceberg indicators are also positive and often of the
same order of magnitude in line with the timing explanation of Hypothesis 3. The positive
and signiﬁcant albeit smaller coeﬃcients for not hit indicators lend further support to this
interpretation.
Speciﬁcation B adds the visible order book volume which we normalize to have a mean of
zero and a unit standard deviation. The estimated parameters on the visible volume on the
hit side are between 0.3 and 0.4 implying that a one standard deviation increase in the visible
volume increases the average market order size by approximately 30 to 40%. The eﬀect is
weaker for the not hit side of the order book with parameters between -0.02 and 0.05. In
this speciﬁcation the parameter estimates for the hit iceberg indicators are all smaller in
magnitude and the change is greater for the not detected iceberg orders. Despite this eﬀect
the hit side eﬀects for the indicators remain around 0.25 suggesting that the greater market
order sizes are not simply a by-product of greater visible order book volume.
19Speciﬁcation C adds the executed iceberg and the predicted hidden volume. The param-
eter estimates on the executed volume on the hit side are positive and signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from zero with values approximately equal to 0.05. The corresponding parameters for the
not hit side are negative. The positive hit side parameters are indicative of a feedback ef-
fect by which a greater volume executed against the iceberg order attracts larger market
orders. The predicted hidden volume also has positive parameter estimates with larger and
signiﬁcant estimates for the hit side and positive but smaller estimates for the other side.
The positive and greater hit side parameter estimates are consistent with larger predicted
hidden volume attracting larger market orders. Overall, the results for speciﬁcation C are




Table VII reports results for a logit model of the probability of a buy market order condi-
tional on iceberg indicators, visible volume, executed iceberg and predicted hidden volume.
The reported ﬁgures are average marginal eﬀects with standard errors in parentheses. In
speciﬁcation A we include indicators for detected and undetected icebergs on the bid and
ask sides of the order book. The estimated marginal eﬀects are between -0.17 and -0.19
for the bid side and 0.17 to 0.19 for the ask side implying that with an iceberg on the ask
side of the order book we observe a shift in the probability of buy market order from 0.5 to
approximately 0.7 with a corresponding eﬀect for the other side. The marginal eﬀects for
the undetected iceberg indicators have the same sign but are less than one-third as large
as the corresponding marginal eﬀects for the detected iceberg orders. The larger marginal
eﬀect of the detected iceberg suggests that liquidity demanders are drawn to the iceberg
order consistent with a advertising eﬀect of Hypothesis 4.
In speciﬁcation B we add the visible volume for the ask and bid sides of the order
book. The visible ask volume has a negative marginal eﬀect of approximately -0.04 which
counteracts the positive marginal eﬀect of a detected iceberg on the ask side. Furthermore,
the average visible volume is slightly positive when an iceberg is detected implying that a
20visible ask volume that is one standard deviation above the mean value for detected iceberg
states on the ask side reduces the probability of a buy market order from 0.71 to 0.55. This
negative eﬀect is consistent with existing evidence of market versus limit order submissions
(see, e.g., Biais, Hillion, and Spatt (1995). It also means that the iceberg submitter who
aﬀects the visible volume by his choice of peak size faces a trade-oﬀ.
In speciﬁcation C we drop the undetected iceberg order and add the executed iceberg
and predicted hidden volume. We normalize the executed and predicted volumes to have a
mean of zero and standard deviation of one, conditional on a value of one for the iceberg
detection indicator. The marginal eﬀect of executed ask volume is positive implying that,
holding other things equal, the probability of a buy market order increases as the volume
executed against the iceberg volume. Like the corresponding results above for the market
order size this is in line with a feedback eﬀect. Together, this is evidence of the iceberg order
itself having an impact on the market order ﬂow that is distinct from any timing eﬀect.
The trading game is a zero-sum game with the proﬁts or losses of liquidity suppliers with
iceberg or limit orders jointly determining the transaction costs for liquidity demanders. To
determine what the joint eﬀects are of the above results on the price impact and the market
order ﬂow we examine the order book proﬁts next.





Table VIII reports the average estimates of the expected order book proﬁts. The expected
order book proﬁts are determined by the conditional probability of an order being executed
multiplied by the signed diﬀerence between the order price and the expected mid-quote
conditional on execution. We prefer to focus on the expected rather than the realized order
book proﬁts because we are interested in how the proﬁts are split between diﬀerent types of
orders or traders something that is diﬃcult to disentangle from the ex post ﬁgures. In order
to compute the order book proﬁts we use the price impact function that we estimated above
21(Table V), the market order size distribution (Table VI), and the probability of a buy market
order (Table VII). We assume further that the market order size distribution is exponential
with a conditional mean order size determined by as reported in Table VI. Appendix A2
provides more details on our procedure for computing the proﬁts.
The overall average order book proﬁts is between 0.5 and 1 basis points. When the
books are split based on whether or not there is an iceberg order we observe greater proﬁts
without iceberg orders and smaller and sometimes negative proﬁts with iceberg orders. Lower
order book proﬁts imply gains for liquidity demanders, which combined with the fact that
we observe larger market orders, suggest that liquidity demanders overall fare better when




Table IX reports the breakdown of the order book proﬁt estimates for order books with
iceberg orders. Panel A reports the estimates for books with detected iceberg orders split by
the order type, iceberg order versus all limit orders, and for limit orders on the side of the
iceberg order versus the opposite side. The ex ante proﬁts for iceberg order do not vary much
across the detected and not detected cases. In contrast, the ex post proﬁts are substantially
greater for the not detected cases ranging from 0.5 to 1 basis points for the ex post case
versus approximately zero for the detected cases.
The limit order proﬁts are negative across the books with detected and undetected iceberg
orders. But, if we split the limit orders whether they are on the same or opposite side of the
iceberg order, we observe that limit orders that are on the side of the iceberg order generate
positive proﬁt both for detected and undetected iceberg orders. The greater expected proﬁts
for unanticipated iceberg orders, the negative proﬁts for limit orders on the opposite side as




Table X reports estimation results for regressions that relate the ex post expected proﬁts
accruing to diﬀerent orders—iceberg orders, limit orders, and market orders—to information
about the iceberg orders and the remaining hidden volume. We are interested in how the
22order book proﬁts are split between the iceberg submitters, the liquidity providers who
use limit orders, and the liquidity demanders. Neither the executed iceberg volume nor
the surprise hidden volume are exogenously given so these regressions are simply used to
illustrate how the proﬁts accruing to diﬀerent types of orders vary across diﬀerent types of
outcomes without implying any causal relationship.
The right-hand side variables have been normalized to have a mean of zero and standard
deviation of one so that the intercept captures the mean proﬁts. For books with detected
iceberg orders the proﬁt for iceberg orders is approximately zero, so the negative proﬁt for
limit orders implies a gain (proﬁt) for the market orders. In contrast, for order books with
undetected iceberg orders the iceberg orders, on average, capture a proﬁt of 0.5 to 1.1 basis
points, and since market orders also capture a small proﬁt, the limit orders suﬀer a loss of
0.5 to 1.7 basis points.
The proﬁts for iceberg orders are increasing in both the predicted hidden volume and
the surprise hidden volume. The eﬀect of the surprise hidden volume is between 1.1 and
2.6 basis points for a one standard deviation shock to the surprise hidden volume providing
evidence that iceberg order that are surprisingly large earn higher proﬁts and, of course, vice
versa for smaller than expected iceberg orders.
The limit order submitters earn lower or even negative proﬁts from order books with
iceberg orders. In contrast they earned positive proﬁts in books without iceberg orders. In
particular, limit orders are exposed to losses driven by two factors. First, limit orders on
the opposite side of iceberg orders suﬀer losses because iceberg orders have price impact; the
losses are more severe when iceberg orders are undetected. Second, limit orders on the same
side of the book as the iceberg orders would earn proﬁts but execution is only likely if they
match the iceberg order’s price otherwise they are too far back in the queue.
The overall results for market order submitters are mixed. The main exception is the
small stock group for which the average estimated proﬁts are positive and signiﬁcant re-
23gardless of whether the iceberg has been detected or not. In general, the proﬁts accruing
to market orders increase in the iceberg order size and in the amount of executed iceberg
volume.
4 Interpretation
We interpret the evidence above as supporting the idea that iceberg orders have a price
impact that depends on the net demand for liquidity. In submitting an iceberg order a trader
balances the beneﬁt of displaying more of her order size—the advertising eﬀect—against the
beneﬁt of hiding more of it. Because it is the iceberg order’s most salient feature the latter
eﬀect has naturally received the most attention. For example, the theoretical models to date
start from the assumption that iceberg orders will be used so as to hide as eﬀectively as
possible. The fact that the observed iceberg order peak sizes deviate signiﬁcantly from the
typical limit order sizes and our main results all suggest that the advertising or signaling
aspects of the iceberg order may be equally important.
The rationale for using iceberg orders is that ex ante the large traders by deﬁnition has
limited information about the latent demand. Submitting an iceberg order is eﬀectively a
way for the trader to search for latent liquidity. If latent demand is discovered, the trader
ends up trading a larger fraction of the order at a price that may compare favorably to
alternative strategies. If no or only limited latent demand is discovered, the trader ends up
executing only a fraction of the order and needs to resubmit or follow an alternative strategy
to complete the trade. But, the greater transaction costs in the latter case are simply a
reﬂection of market conditions and in some sense the trader is no worse oﬀ having searched
for the latent demand using the iceberg order.
The welfare properties of market designs with iceberg orders is obviously an important
question. Although we cannot address that question directly our results shed some light
24on the issues involved. The evidence of feedback eﬀects with more executed iceberg volume
attracting larger market orders and increasing the probability of market orders hitting the
iceberg order are indicative of a potential positive externality of iceberg orders. On the other
hand, other liquidity providers who submit limit orders do not fare well in order books with
iceberg orders. They make up for that with higher proﬁts in order books without iceberg
orders but that means that it is hard to determine the net eﬀect.
Our results have some implications for the way we think about the dynamic aspects of
the iceberg strategy. In particular, the ﬁxed price for each of the iceberg order’s peaks is
intriguing in the light of the above results. Both our price impact and market order ﬂow
results show that there are distinct time patterns and these patterns remain in the order
book proﬁt results. One can think of the iceberg order submitter as a seller who sequentially
auctions oﬀ multiple peaks at a ﬁxed price. One part of the auction literature documents and
studies a phenomenon that is known as the declining price anomaly in multi-unit sequential
auctions (see, for example, Bernhardt and Scoones (1993)). The anomaly is that prices for
identical items sold in later auctions tend to be lower than those sold in earlier auctions. In
the case of iceberg orders the puzzle is that the prices are ﬁxed for each ‘round’ or peak but
because new information is revealed with the execution of each peak it would appear that
the value is changing. The question then is under what assumptions is an iceberg order with
a ﬁxed price per peak the optimal type of iceberg order? For example, why not have an
iceberg order that moves the price to buy down marginally after each executed peak? Or an
iceberg order whose peak size increases dynamically after detection? And, if the ﬁxed price
is optimal, then what is the optimal strategy for liquidity demanders?
255 Conclusions
We examine the impact of iceberg orders on the price and order ﬂow dynamics in limit
order books. One of our main ﬁndings is that we ﬁnd strong support for an advertising
or signalling eﬀect of iceberg orders. Part of the eﬀect is an artifact of the iceberg order
type—the fact that it is detectable—but part of it is under the control of the iceberg order
submitter through her choice of peak size. An important outstanding question is how the
optimal peak size is determined for a given total order size.
In principle, the order updates generated by an iceberg order can also be replicated
using a dynamic order submission strategy. What determines the choice between these two
seemingly equivalent strategies? Does the fact that the iceberg order is in the limit order
book increase its eﬀectiveness in terms of signalling?
Even if we abstract from the signalling, the iceberg order itself is a pre-packaged dynamic
order submission strategy. Likewise, a market order submitter who trades against a detected
iceberg order solves a special dynamic order submission problem since the iceberg order
temporarily makes the order book perfectly resilient after each executed peak. Under what
assumptions can we rationalize these types of strategies in existing dynamic models of optimal
trading such as Bertsimas and Lo (1998), Huberman and Stanzl (2005), Obizhaeva and Wang
(2006)?
Addressing these questions as well as determining the welfare properties of market design
with iceberg orders are all important topics for future research.
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28Figure 1: A mosaic plot of the peak size (horizontal axis) against the total size (vertical axis) for
DPW. We use the following cut-oﬀs for peak size categories: 1-1,500 shares ⇒ 1K; 1,501-2,500 ⇒
2K; 2,501-3,500 ⇒ 3K; 3,501-7,500 ⇒ 5K; 7,501+ ⇒ 10K; and total size categories: 1-7,500 shares
⇒ 5K; 7,501-12,500 ⇒ 10K; 12,501-17,500 ⇒ 15K; 17,501-35,000 ⇒ 20K; 35,001+ ⇒ 50K. The
plot is constructed by dividing the unit interval into ﬁve segments whose lengths are proportional
to the frequency of observed peak sizes that fall within each category. This determines the width
of each ‘box’. The height of each box is determined similarly by the frequencies of total sizes for a
given peak size category. The shading reﬂects the deviation from the relationship expected under
independence and is based on the standardized (Pearson) residuals; dark shading (large “+”), > 4;
light shading (small “+”), 2 : 4; solid box 0 : 2; dashed box −2 : 0; dashed box (small “-”) −4 : −2.
Residuals in excess of 4 in absolute value correspond to a p-value of 0.0001 and residuals between
2 and 4 in absolute value to a p-value of 0.05 for a chi-square test with the null hypothesis of
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Figure 2: The graph shows the relationship between the number of executed peaks and the remain-
ing hidden volume for detected iceberg orders. Each set of bars in the graph represent the average
hidden volume at the best quote as a function of the number of executed peaks (up to 15 peaks) for
diﬀerent peak size categories for DPW. The counter for the number of executed peaks keeps track
of the iceberg order history so that, if an iceberg after detection is undercut, but later reappears
at the best quote the counter will remember the past executed peaks and only reset the counter
when the iceberg leaves the book. The dots connected by the solid line represent the average ﬁtted
values for a regression that predicts the hidden volume based on the peak size and the number of
executed peaks, see Section 2.2.2 and Table IV. The cut-oﬀs used for the peak size are as follows:
1-1,500 shares ⇒ 1K; 1,501-2,500 ⇒ 2K; 2,501-3,500 ⇒ 3K; 3,501+ ⇒ 5K. The remaining hidden
volume is scaled by the average peak size for all icebergs.
30Table I: Iceberg Orders: Summary Statistics
Large Medium Small All
Panel A: Iceberg Orders’ Share of Non-Marketable Orders [%]
Percent of shares submitted 6.9 (1.1) 11.2 (4.9) 9.8 (3.2) 9.3 (3.6)
Percent of shares executed 14.8 (3.1) 19.4 (3.8) 14.8 (5.2) 15.9 (4.7)
Panel B: Median Distance between Order Price and Best Quote [basis points]
Iceberg Orders 3.1 (1.5) 4.2 (2.2) 3.6 (1.9) 3.6 (1.9)
Limit Orders 3.9 (1.1) 4.8 (1.9) 3.5 (2.1) 3.9 (1.9)
Panel C: Average Size of Iceberg and Limit Orders
Iceberg Orders
Total Size [1000 shares] 17.3 (12.3) 19.2 (8.7) 14.0 (4.4) 16.1 (8.2)
Peak Size [1000 shares] 3.1 (3.2) 3.2 (1.9) 2.0 (0.9) 2.6 (2.0)
Submitted # of Peaks 7.3 (1.2) 7.1 (0.7) 7.9 (0.9) 7.6 (1.0)
Executed # of Peaks 5.6 (0.6) 5.6 (0.3) 5.3 (0.5) 5.5 (0.5)
Limit Orders [1000 shares] 1.4 (1.7) 1.3 (0.8) 0.7 (0.4) 1.0 (1.0)
Panel D: Clustering of Iceberg Peak Size, Total Size and Number of Peaks
Total Size [%] 47.6 (10.1) 41.5 (2.4) 46.1 (6.1) 45.4 (7.0)
Peak Size [%] 58.2 (14.7) 49.8 (6.6) 63.9 (15.0) 59.1 (14.3)
Number of Peaks [%] 35.9 (8.6) 31.8 (6.2) 34.9 (6.6) 34.4 (7.0)
Table I reports summary statistics for iceberg orders and limit orders. Panel A reports the percent-
age of submitted and executed (non-marketable) orders that are iceberg orders. Panel B reports
the cross-sectional average of the median distance between the order price and the best quote on
the same side of the order book for iceberg orders and limit orders. Panel C reports the average
iceberg order total size (1000 shares), the average peak size (1000 shares), the average number of
peaks submitted, and the average number of peaks executed for iceberg orders with at least one
executed peak. The last row of Panel C reports the average limit order size (1000 shares). Panel D
reports the percentage of all observations that are accounted for by the three most common values
of the total size, peak size, and the number of peaks. The sum of the frequencies for the top three
values are computed for each stock and then averaged within each category or across the three
categories. Cross-sectional standard deviations are reported in parentheses.
31Table II: Iceberg Orders: Realized Proﬁt and Executions
Panel A: Realized Proﬁt [basis points]
Dependent Variable: Realized Proﬁt Using the Mid-Quote
Thirty Minutes After the Execution of the Last Peak
OLS Large Medium Small
Intercept 1.66 1.66 1.66 2.78 2.78 2.78 3.74 3.74 3.74
(0.72) (0.72) (0.72) (0.82) (0.82) (0.82) (1.50) (1.50) (1.50)
Order Size 0.60 5.59 5.98 1.19 7.47 7.85 1.06 7.16 7.89
(0.72) (1.04) (1.10) (0.82) (1.23) (1.30) (1.50) (1.86) (2.01)
Executed Volume -6.85 -6.67 -8.47 -8.28 -9.82 -9.53
(1.04) (1.05) (1.23) (1.25) (1.86) (1.89)
Peak Size -0.95 -0.92 -1.89
(0.87) (1.01) (1.77)
Panel B: First Peak Execution Probability (Marginal Eﬀects)
Logit Dependent Variable: Execution Indicator for 1st Peak
Order Size 3.55 3.68 2.70
(0.80) (0.75) (1.35)
Peak Size -1.50 -2.91 -2.61
(0.76) (0.75) (1.27)
Distance to -14.73 -14.38 -12.91
Best Quote (0.73) (0.69) (1.28)
Panel C: Conditional Execution Percentage (Marginal Eﬀects)
Ordered Logit Dependent Variable: Execution Percentage
Order Size -6.27 -7.23 -8.33
(0.65) (0.64) (1.49)
Peak Size 5.93 6.20 7.19
(0.75) (0.74) (0.11)
Distance to 0.81 1.12 0.03
Best Quote (0.54) (0.54) (1.60)
Table II reports regression results for the realized proﬁt and executions of iceberg orders. Panel A
reports estimates for a regression of the realized proﬁt for icebergs with at least one executed peak
on an intercept, the order size, the executed volume, and the peak size. For a buy iceberg order the
realized proﬁt is measured as the diﬀerence between the mid-quote 30 minutes after the order’s last
execution and the order price. The units are basis points. The regressions are estimated stock-by-
stock and we report the average parameters estimates with average standard errors in parentheses.
All variables are normalized to have a mean of zero and standard deviation of one. Panel B reports
the marginal eﬀects (in percent) for a logit model for the probability of the ﬁrst peak being executed
as a function of the order size, the peak size, and the distance between the order price and the
best quote on the same side. Panel C reports the corresponding (combined) marginal eﬀects for
an ordered logit model of the total execution percentage conditional on execution of the 1st peak.
The distance from the best quote is deﬁned as the diﬀerence between the best (same side) quote
and the iceberg order’s price, in basis points, at the time of the order submission.
32Table III: Detecting Iceberg Orders
Large Medium Small
Prediction Prediction Prediction
Truth No Yes Sum No Yes Sum No Yes Sum
No 90.0 1.0 91.0 84.7 1.5 86.2 89.9 0.8 90.7
(1.2) (0.2) (1.0) (2.1) (0.2) (1.9) (1.4) (0.1) (1.1)
Yes 2.9 6.1 9.0 4.6 9.2 13.8 3.1 6.1 9.3
(0.5) (0.5) (1.0) (0.8) (1.1) (1.9) (0.4) (0.8) (1.3)
Sum 92.9 7.1 100.0 89.3 10.7 100.0 93.0 7.0 100.0
(0.7) (0.7) (1.3) (1.3) (0.9) (0.8)
Table III reports, for the best ask quote in the book, the cross-sectional averages for the pre-
dictions (yes/no) generated by the iceberg detection algorithm across the percentages of the
true iceberg status (yes/no). The columns of each 2×2 matrix correspond to the algorithm’s
predictions and the rows correspond to the truth. Entries on the diagonal correspond to
correct predictions. The cross-sectional standard errors of the means are reported in paren-
theses below each mean. The results for the bid side are similar with the largest diﬀerence
being of the order of less than one-half percentage points.
33Table IV: Predicting Hidden Volume
Dependent Variable: Hidden Volume at Best Quote
Large Medium Small
Intercept 2.29 2.55 2.34 2.60 2.66 2.92
(0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.20) (0.21)
I
peak




10+ -0.98 -1.36 -1.19
(0.23) (0.21) (0.51)
Peak Size 2.28 2.22 2.26 2.22 2.72 2.67
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.16) (0.16)












10+ × (Peakt − 10) -0.11 -0.03 -0.16
(0.06) (0.05) (0.14)
R2 0.19 0.21 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.19
Table IV reports average parameter estimates for regressions of the hidden volume at the best
quote on the number of peaks executed and the peak size of the iceberg order. The number
of peaks is denoted by Peakt and is deﬁned as the number of peaks that have been fully
executed at the current price since the iceberg was detected; the number of peaks restarts









10+ interacted with the peak
counter (Peakt). Both the hidden volume and the peak size are normalized by the average
peak size for each stock. We estimate the regressions stock-by-stock for all observations with
a detected iceberg and report the average parameter estimates for the large, medium, and
small categories with average standard errors in parentheses.
34Table V: Impact on Prices
Dependent Variable: Large Medium Small
∆Mid-quote over next 30 Trades A B C D A B C D A B C D
Intercept -0.15 -0.15 -0.15 -0.15 -0.28 -0.28 -0.29 -0.29 -0.20 -0.21 -0.21 -0.21
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Signed Trade 1.80 1.80 1.79 1.79 2.54 2.53 2.52 2.51 3.19 3.17 3.15 3.14
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Signed Trade Size 0.42 0.42 0.44 0.44 0.57 0.58 0.60 0.61 0.89 0.90 0.93 0.93
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Signed Iceberg Indicator 0.71 0.42 0.43 0.14 0.78 -0.12 -0.28 -0.57 1.45 0.21 0.22 -0.28
(0.06) (0.12) (0.12) (0.08) (0.10) (0.25) (0.25) (0.13) (0.15) (0.32) (0.34) (0.21)
Iceb. Ind. × Signed Trade Size -0.16 -0.17 -0.16 -0.16 -0.16 -0.16 -0.15 -0.15 -0.29 -0.30 -0.29 -0.29
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Executed Iceberg Volume -0.07 -0.07 -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 -0.14 -0.15 -0.16
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Predicted Hidden Volume 0.10 0.10 0.20 0.24 0.27 0.28
(0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Actual-Predicted Hidden Volume 0.15 0.28 0.36
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
Actual Hidden Volume 0.14 0.28 0.35
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
Table V reports the parameter estimates for regressions of the mid-quote change over the next 30 trades on a constant,
the sign of the trade, the signed trade size, a signed iceberg indicator, the iceberg indicator multiplied by the trade size,
and, in speciﬁcations B and C, the executed iceberg volume, the predicted (remaining) hidden volume, the surprise hidden
volume (actual-predicted), and, in speciﬁcation D, the actual hidden volume. The signed iceberg indicator is deﬁned as
the indicator for an iceberg order on the bid side minus an indicator for an iceberg on the ask side of the order book. The
iceberg indicator times the signed trade size is deﬁned as the indicator for an iceberg on the bid or the ask side multiplied
by the signed trade size. The units for the change in the mid-quote is basis points. The executed and predicted hidden
volume are signed so that bid side volume is positive and ask side volume is negative.
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5Table VI: Impact on the Market Order Flow: The Market Order Size
Dependent Variable: Market Order Size Large Medium Small
A B C A B C A B C
Intercept 0.950 0.960 0.972 0.919 0.939 0.961 0.934 0.952 0.968
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Variables Associated with the Order Book Side Hit by the Market Order
Iceberg Detected 0.401 0.253 0.272 0.435 0.273 0.246 0.426 0.259 0.286
(0.010) (0.011) (0.005) (0.011) (0.011) (0.006) (0.012) (0.012) (0.007)
Iceberg Not Detected 0.307 0.282 0.294 0.262 0.379 0.295
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
Visible Volume 0.273 0.273 0.404 0.404 0.404 0.403
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Executed Iceberg Volume 0.051 0.045 0.064
(0.008) (0.009) (0.011)
Predicted Hidden Volume 0.110 0.099 0.091
(0.011) (0.010) (0.023)
Variables Associated with the Order Book Side Not Hit by the Market Order
Iceberg Detected 0.111 0.080 0.032 0.183 0.136 0.068 0.212 0.183 0.069
(0.009) (0.009) (0.007) (0.010) (0.010) (0.008) (0.011) (0.011) (0.009)
Iceberg Not Detected 0.074 0.035 0.154 0.076 0.138 0.073
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009)
Visible Volume -0.019 -0.018 0.030 0.034 0.051 0.054
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Executed Iceberg Volume -0.022 -0.029 -0.054
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Predicted Hidden Volume 0.055 0.027 0.055
(0.008) (0.010) (0.008)
Table VI reports results for regressions of the market order size on iceberg detection indicators, indicators for undetected
iceberg orders, visible volume, executed iceberg volume, and predicted hidden volume for the side of the order book that
is ‘hit’ by the incoming market order and the side that is ‘not hit.’. We estimate the regressions stock-by-stock and report
the average parameter estimates and standard errors. All order book volume variables are normalized to have a mean of
zero and the market order size is normalized to have a mean of one.
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6Table VII: Impact on the Market Order Flow: The Probability of a Buy Market Order
Large Medium Small
A B C A B C A B C
Ask Side Variables
Iceberg Detected 0.192 0.192 0.191 0.174 0.170 0.167 0.174 0.175 0.174
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Iceberg Not Detected 0.052 0.072 0.044 0.061 0.022 0.039
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
Visible Volume -0.043 -0.042 -0.051 -0.050 -0.042 -0.042
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Executed Iceberg Volume 0.028 0.028 0.028
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Predicted Hidden Volume -0.004 -0.001 0.005
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Bid Side Variables
Iceberg Detected -0.192 -0.193 -0.191 -0.168 -0.165 -0.164 -0.177 -0.179 -0.178
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Iceberg Not Detected -0.052 -0.071 -0.035 -0.053 -0.030 -0.049
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
Visible Volume 0.041 0.039 0.054 0.054 0.045 0.045
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Executed Iceberg Volume -0.023 -0.030 -0.030
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Predicted Hidden Volume 0.004 -0.003 -0.002
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Table VII reports the average marginal eﬀects for three logit-model speciﬁcations for the probability of a buy market order
with average standard errors in parentheses. The explanatory variables are the iceberg detection indicators, indicators
for undetected icebergs, the visible volume, the executed iceberg volume, and the predicted hidden volume at the ask and
bid sides.
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7Table VIII: Impact on Order Book Proﬁts
Large Medium Small
Panel A: Ex Ante
All Books 0.67 (0.02) 1.13 (0.04) 0.96 (0.07)
Books without Icebergs 0.78 (0.02) 1.31 (0.04) 1.20 (0.07)
Books with Icebergs 0.18 (0.04) 0.64 (0.07) -0.01 (0.13)
- not detected 0.80 (0.03) 1.74 (0.06) 1.28 (0.09)
- detected -0.11 (0.05) 0.10 (0.09) -0.64 (0.18)
Panel B: Ex Post
All Books 0.59 (0.02) 0.95 (0.04) 0.79 (0.07)
Books without Icebergs 0.76 (0.02) 1.29 (0.04) 1.16 (0.07)
Books with Icebergs -0.14 (0.04) 0.05 (0.07) -0.73 (0.13)
- not detected -0.04 (0.03) 0.08 (0.07) -0.60 (0.09)
- detected -0.18 (0.05) 0.04 (0.09) -0.80 (0.18)
Table VIII reports the average estimates for the expected order book proﬁts with
standard errors in parentheses. We compute the order book proﬁts across all limit and
iceberg orders by deﬁning the proﬁts per market order arrival as the product of the
probability of execution and the signed diﬀerence between the order price and the expected
mid-quote conditional on execution. The calculations use our estimates for the price impact
of market orders, the market order size distribution, and the conditional probability of buy
versus sell market orders. Panel A reports the Ex Ante and Panel B the Ex Post ﬁgures.
The diﬀerences between Ex Ante and Ex Post order book proﬁts are that we include the
surprise hidden volume and replace the predicted with the actual hidden volume in the Ex
Post proﬁt calculations. The order book proﬁts are measured in basis points per market
order arrival. The standard errors take into account the estimation errors from the ﬁrst
stage parameter estimates.
38Table IX: Breakdown of Proﬁts for Order Books with Iceberg Orders
Large Medium Small
Panel A: Detected Icebergs
Iceberg Order ex ante -0.10 (0.04) -0.18 (0.06) -0.37 (0.11)
ex post 0.01 (0.04) 0.03 (0.06) -0.12 (0.11)
Limit Orders ex ante -0.01 (0.04) 0.28 (0.06) -0.28 (0.12)
ex post -0.20 (0.04) 0.00 (0.06) -0.68 (0.12)
- side of Iceberg ex ante 0.09 (0.01) 0.11 (0.02) 0.05 (0.02)
ex post 0.14 (0.01) 0.24 (0.02) 0.17 (0.03)
- opposite ex ante -0.10 (0.04) 0.17 (0.06) -0.33 (0.11)
ex post -0.34 (0.04) -0.24 (0.06) -0.85 (0.12)
Panel B: Not Detected Icebergs
Iceberg Order ex ante -0.13 (0.01) -0.14 (0.01) -0.29 (0.02)
ex post 0.40 (0.02) 0.71 (0.03) 1.00 (0.05)
Limit Orders ex ante 0.92 (0.02) 1.84 (0.05) 1.56 (0.07)
ex post -0.44 (0.04) -0.63 (0.06) -1.58 (0.09)
- side of iceberg ex ante 0.35 (0.01) 0.75 (0.02) 0.65 (0.02)
ex post 0.21 (0.01) 0.36 (0.01) 0.28 (0.01)
- opposite ex ante 0.57 (0.02) 1.09 (0.04) 0.90 (0.05)
ex post -0.64 (0.04) -0.99 (0.06) -1.86 (0.10)
Table IX reports the breakdown of the order book proﬁts for order book with iceberg orders,
at the best quote, into two categories: order books with detected iceberg orders in Panel
A and order books with undetected icebergs in Panel B. Each panels reports the proﬁts
by order type, iceberg versus limit order, by side of the order book for limit orders, side of
iceberg versus opposite side, and by conditioning information, ex ante versus ex post. We
compute the order book proﬁts across all limit and iceberg orders by deﬁning the proﬁts
per market order arrival as the product of the probability of execution and the signed
diﬀerence between the order price and the expected mid-quote conditional on execution.
The calculations use our estimates for the price impact of market orders, the market order
size distribution, and the conditional probability of buy versus sell market orders. The
diﬀerences between ex ante and ex post order book proﬁts are that we include the surprise
hidden volume and replace the predicted with the actual hidden volume in the ex post
proﬁt calculations. The order book proﬁts are measured in basis points per market order
arrival. We report standard errors in parentheses. The standard errors take into account
the estimation errors from the ﬁrst stage parameter estimates.
39Table X: Determinants of Proﬁts for Order Books with Iceberg Orders
Dependent Variable: Ex Post Order Book Proﬁt
Large Medium Small
Panel A: Detected Icebergs
Iceberg Orders
Intercept 0.01 (0.04) 0.03 (0.06) -0.12 (0.11)
Executed Iceberg Volume -0.44 (0.04) -0.44 (0.05) -0.99 (0.09)
Predicted Hidden Volume 0.34 (0.03) 0.27 (0.04) 0.86 (0.11)
Surprise Hidden Volume 0.86 (0.03) 1.14 (0.03) 1.78 (0.06)
Limit Orders
Intercept -0.20 (0.04) 0.00 (0.06) -0.68 (0.12)
Executed Iceberg Volume 0.28 (0.03) 0.07 (0.04) 0.27 (0.09)
Predicted Hidden Volume -0.64 (0.05) -0.98 (0.06) -2.12 (0.16)
Surprise Hidden Volume -1.27 (0.04) -1.35 (0.04) -3.08 (0.10)
Market Orders
Intercept 0.18 (0.05) -0.04 (0.09) 0.80 (0.18)
Executed Iceberg Volume 0.16 (0.02) 0.38 (0.02) 0.75 (0.05)
Predicted Hidden Volume 0.30 (0.03) 0.74 (0.04) 1.29 (0.12)
Surprise Hidden Volume 0.41 (0.03) 0.23 (0.02) 1.36 (0.08)
Panel B: Not Detected Icebergs
Iceberg Orders
Intercept 0.40 (0.02) 0.71 (0.03) 1.00 (0.05)
Surprise Hidden Volume 0.66 (0.02) 0.95 (0.03) 1.39 (0.04)
Limit Orders
Intercept -0.44 (0.04) -0.63 (0.06) -1.58 (0.09)
Surprise Hidden Volume -1.45 (0.05) -3.10 (0.08) -3.22 (0.09)
Market Orders
Intercept 0.04 (0.03) -0.08 (0.07) 0.60 (0.09)
Surprise Hidden Volume 0.79 (0.03) 2.20 (0.06) 1.87 (0.05)
Table X reports parameter estimates for regressions of the ex post proﬁts with the
executed iceberg volume, the predicted hidden volume, and the surprise hidden volumes as
independent variables. We estimate a separate regression for iceberg orders, limit orders,
and market orders for each stock and report average parameter estimates with standard
errors in parentheses. The proﬁts for market orders are deﬁned as minus the total order
book proﬁts. Panel A reports the results for detected iceberg orders and Panel B reports the
results for not detected iceberg orders. The right hand side variables have been normalized
to have a mean of zero and unit standard deviation so that the intercept captures the mean
proﬁt. The units are basis points per share and market order arrival.Appendices
A1 Descriptive Statistics for Sample Stocks
MCAP Trad. Vol. Mid-Quote Trades Trade Size Bid-Ask Spread
Ticker [eb] [eb] [e] [1000] [1000 shrs] [b.p.] [cents]
Large ALV 33.8 18.6 99.5 289.1 0.6 4.6 4.5
DBK 38.2 19.8 67.6 253.4 1.2 4.0 2.7
DCX 30.3 12.0 36.3 211.6 1.6 5.2 1.9
DTE 34.9 22.4 15.6 284.4 5.0 7.1 1.1
EOA 33.8 10.3 52.5 183.7 1.1 4.5 2.4
MUV2 16.4 13.3 93.6 218.9 0.6 4.6 4.3
SAP 27.4 11.8 131.0 179.4 0.5 4.6 6.0
SIE 52.9 20.6 63.7 282.5 1.1 3.9 2.5
Mean 33.5 16.1 70.0 237.9 1.5 4.8 3.2
Medium BAS 25.4 8.0 43.1 165.1 1.1 4.7 2.0
BAY 15.9 5.7 22.8 153.5 1.6 7.1 1.6
BMW 12.2 5.6 34.7 134.9 1.2 5.6 1.9
HVM 6.6 6.3 18.5 123.7 2.8 9.2 1.7
IFX 4.8 9.4 11.6 179.0 4.5 10.0 1.2
RWE 12.7 6.3 33.9 148.0 1.2 5.9 2.0
VOW 9.7 6.7 39.2 162.8 1.0 5.2 2.0
Mean 12.5 6.8 29.1 152.4 1.9 6.8 1.8
Small ADS 4.1 2.0 92.5 62.6 0.4 6.7 6.1
ALT 3.3 2.0 48.8 69.9 0.6 7.4 3.6
CBK 7.6 3.4 15.3 92.7 2.4 9.6 1.5
CONT 4.1 1.6 31.5 64.0 0.8 8.8 2.8
DB1 4.8 2.3 47.0 62.8 0.8 7.0 3.3
DPW 6.8 2.8 18.2 84.1 1.8 9.3 1.7
FME 1.9 0.8 53.8 39.7 0.4 9.4 5.0
HEN3 3.7 1.2 65.8 44.9 0.4 7.3 4.8
LHA 4.5 2.8 14.1 86.5 2.3 10.6 1.5
LIN 3.4 1.4 43.6 57.3 0.6 7.5 3.3
MAN 2.4 1.8 27.7 67.6 0.9 9.1 2.5
MEO 5.0 2.5 34.8 79.0 0.9 8.4 2.9
SCH 7.1 3.3 41.0 97.4 0.8 6.7 2.7
TKA 6.4 2.4 15.8 80.7 1.9 10.7 1.7
TUI 2.0 1.7 18.7 67.8 1.3 11.5 2.1
Mean 4.5 2.1 37.9 70.5 1.1 8.7 3.0
Table A1 reports the market capitalization, the trading volume, the average mid-quote, the total number of
trades, the average trade size (1000 shares), and the average relative (basis points) and absolute (euro cents)
bid-ask spreads for the sample stocks. The market capitalization is calculated using a free-ﬂoat methodology,
in billions of euros as of December 2003. The sample period is January 2nd to March 31st, 2004.
41A2 Order Book Proﬁt Calculation
In this appendix we show how we compute the expected order book proﬁts discussed in section 3.3.
Our set-up is similar to the one used by Sand˚ as (2001) and Frey and Grammig (2006) in their tests
of implications of the Glosten (1994) model. The main innovations are that we explicitly take into
account the hidden volume in the order book and its eﬀect on price and order ﬂow dynamics.
Our econometric approach combines the speciﬁcations for the price impact, the market order
size and the probability of a buy market order in a combined method of moments estimation. The
moment equations are the score functions of the linear regression models, respectively the logit
model for the buy probability.
Denote the change of the mid-quote from t to t + τ as ∆p, the (unsigned) market order size as
M and the indicator for a buy market order as d+.
We apply this notation to the vectors of exogenous variables X∆p, XM and Xd+ and to the
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The speciﬁcation for the price impact X∆p changes depending on whether we estimate the proﬁt
with public information available at the time of trade, ex ante speciﬁcation B in Table V, or if we
estimate it after adding the surprise volume, ex post speciﬁcation C in Table V. The speciﬁcations
of exogenous variables for market order size, XM (speciﬁcation C in Table VI), and buy probability,
Xd+ (speciﬁcation C in Table VII), are identical for the calculation of ex ante and ex post proﬁt.
To derive the expected proﬁt of the limit order book we calculate upper- and lower-tail expec-
tations to determine the expected revision in the stock price conditional on execution as in Glosten
(1994).
Brieﬂy, limit orders are executed in a discriminatory fashion. A limit sell order that is executed
if a buy market order of size M arrives is also executed by any larger buy market order. Thus we
compare the potential revenue to the expected price change for the whole range of potential market
orders which could execute the limit order.
Consider a single unit at the ask side of the order book at queue position q. Its spread deﬁned
as the distance between its limit price and the current mid-quote is denoted as s(q). The expected









f(M|XM;θM) dM, (A 2)
with Pr(d+|.) denoting the probability of a buy market order, δp(M|.) the expected price change
of the market order with size M and f(M|.) the probability density function of the market order
size. X
\M
∆p is the set of exogenous variables used in the price impact speciﬁcation excluding the
market order size.
The speciﬁcation above is valid for any distribution of the market order size but can be solved




























with I denoting the (unsigned) iceberg indicator, which interacts with the market order size in the




∆p include the exogenous
variables and parameters except the market order size and the iceberg indicator. The parameters
θM
∆p and θI×M
∆p refer to the market order size and the interaction between market order size and
iceberg indicator.
For an aggregated block, for example, one order or all orders at a given price, with price
distance s, which starts at queue position Qs and ends at position Qe the expected proﬁt is denoted
Π(Qe;Qs) =
R Qe
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denoting the complementary cdf of the exponential distribution.
For the standard errors of the expected proﬁts we consider both the errors from the GMM
estimation and the sampling error for the calculations from the order books in the sample. The
uncertainty of the estimated parameters of the GMM model is considered via the delta method.
We combine the two errors by assuming independence. Denote P as one of the terms in Tables
VIII to X, then an estimator of the variance of P, σ2









in which V (θ) denotes the estimated variance matrix of the model parameters and s2
P is the sampling
variance of the proﬁt term for Tables VIII and IX or the estimated variance for the regression
parameters in Table X. The gradient vector of the proﬁt term to the parameters ∂P
∂θ is calculated
numerically.
43A3 Detection Algorithm: An Example
This appendix provides more details about algorithm that tries to replicate the modus operandi which
allows professional traders to detect iceberg orders in the order book. The algorithm assumes an iceberg to
be detected after the ﬁrst replenishment. After the detection the algorithm keeps the detection state until
all visible volume of the quote is cancelled or an expected replenishment has not occurred. It tracks the
following properties: Iceberg detection state, peak volume of the detected iceberg, executed volume from
the detected iceberg and the true hidden volume. Executed volume and peak volume are used to predict
the hidden order volume of a detected iceberg. The algorithm assumes that market participant to compare
the execution records with the observed order book before each trade and then keep track of updates of the
order book thereafter. In case of a fast market with many orders clustering it may overstate the market
participants’ knowledge. On the other hand, there are several possible extensions to enhance the algorithm.
Overall we consider the algorithm a good proxy for the information set of sophisticated traders.
The example below illustrates the detection algorithm.
Limit Order Book at t = 1:









The ﬁgure above depicts a simple order book conﬁguration. The best bid and ask are both deﬁned by one
limit order, the visible volume variable V equals the size of the limit orders and the iceberg indicator for the
best quotes I are zero.
Limit Order Book at t = 2:











A buy iceberg order with peak volume of 1000 and a total volume of 4000 is submitted at the best bid price
level. The peak volume increases the visible volume, but the iceberg iceberg indicator at the best quote
remains unchanged, as the iceberg is not detected. The hidden volume (H = 3000) is only used for ex post
calculations.
Limit Order Book at t = 3:












A sell market order for 2500 shares arrives. It executes ﬁrst against the limit order and the peak volume
of the iceberg order. Then shares from the hidden part of the order book enter the visible book and the
remaining 500 shares are executed against the new peak. Due to this ﬁrst replenishment the algorithm con-
siders the iceberg to be detected and stores peak size P and executed volume E. Those are used to predict
the hidden volume ˆ H as speciﬁed in table IV.
44Limit Order Book at t = 4:












A buy limit order with 1500 shares is submitted inside the spread. The new quote replaces the one with the
iceberg order as the best bid. Accordingly both the visible volume and the iceberg indicator are adjusted.
The algorithm still tracks the properties of the iceberg order deeper in the book.
Limit Order Book at t = 5:












A market order to sell 3000 shares is submitted. It executes ﬁrst against the limit order at the best bid,
another 500 shares execute against the remaining peak volume. It triggers another replenishment. As the
iceberg was detected previously the iceberg indicator for the best bid is set again. The detection algorithm
updates hidden and executed volumes and accordingly a new predicted hidden volume is applied.
Limit Order Book at t = 6:












Two events occurred in the meantime: First two additional buy limit orders with 1000 shares and 1500 shares
were submitted at the best quote and then the iceberg order was cancelled. The iceberg indicator at the
best quote is still equal to one, as the algorithm has not yet detected the cancellation.2 Only the true hidden
volume is updated.
Limit Order Book at t = 7:









Another sell market order with 1500 shares executes the ﬁrst limit order and 500 shares of the second. As
a replenishment was expected after 1000 shares executed from this quote the algorithm removes the iceberg
state from this price level.
2An enhanced algorithm could take into account that the cancellation of 1000 shares potentially indicates
a cancellation of the iceberg order.
45A4 Estimation Details
This appendix reports further details on the empirical procedure used throughout the paper. It
ﬁrst covers the reconstruction of the limit order book and order histories from the XETRA log ﬁles.
A discussion of the methods and adjustments in the estimation tables follows.
XETRA sample
1. Only observations from the continuous trading are used. All auctions (including volatility inter-
ruptions) are removed. For the reconstruction we take into account the eﬀects that any order
submissions, transactions, or cancellations in the auctions have on the state of the order book
dring continuous trading.
2. On the 6th of February 2004 all XETRA trading was interrupted during the continuous trading.
All observations of this day are excluded.3
3. From the order histories we reconstruct snapshots of the displayed and hidden order books
1/100th of a second before each transaction.
4. At the start of the day, after the midday auction and volatility interruptions the ﬁrst ten trans-
actions are removed (exceptions are the calculations for Tables I, II, and A1).
Table I
1. All included orders are exclusively from the continuous trading regime; these orders never con-
tributed to the order book during an auction.
2. In Panel A partially marketable limit and iceberg orders only contribute with their non-marketable
volumes.
Table II
1. Both in Panels B and C the marginal eﬀects reported are the mean of the marginal eﬀects
evaluated at each observation (average marginal eﬀects). The standard errors are derived from
the standard errors of the logit parameters via the delta method.
2. In Panel C the execution percentage is modelled by an ordered logit with ﬁve classes (0-20%,
20-40%, 40-60%, 60-80%, 80-100%). The (combined) marginal eﬀect is the sum of marginal
eﬀects of each class multiplied with the respective class mean.
3. Exogenous variables in all panels are normalized to zero mean and unit standard deviation.
Table III
The detection algorithm (see Appendix A3) tracks each price level separately. The table reports
the percentages for the observations at each transaction. If there are several icebergs at each
side, the volume variables (hidden and executed volumes) are combined. The peak volume,
however, is always updated to the one with the latest replenishment of the peak.
Table IV and Figure 2
1. The speciﬁcation ignores that the range for hidden volume is truncated at zero. The average
percentage of negative predictions is very small (0.016% for large, 0.002% for medium, and
0.014$ for small stocks).
2. Number of peaks executed is the ratio of executed volume from iceberg to peak size stored by
the detection algorithm (see Appendix A3).
3Refer to XETRA Newsboard message 2004/02/06 11:03:35
http://deutsche-boerse.com/dbag/dispatch/de/xetraNewsboard/gdb_navigation/trading/10_trading_platforms/200_
xetra/100_xetra_newsboard?news=31872&venue=1
46Tables V to VII
1. All speciﬁcations are estimated separately on an identical dataset for stock group. The score
functions for Tables V, VI, and VII are given by the ﬁrst, second, and third row of matrix A 1
in Appendix A2. Parameters are estimated by the method of moments (this equals the maxi-
mum likelihood estimation). Standard errors are derived by a heteroscedasticity autocorrelation
covariance (HAC) estimator with a ten lags Bartlett kernel.
2. All observations are pooled by stock groups (as shown in Table A1). For the calculation of
autocovariances only pairs of observation are used which belong to an uninterrupted period of
continuous trading in the same stock. We verify the robustness of our ﬁndings by estimating all
models separately by stock.
3. The variables labeled ‘predicted hidden volume’ and ‘executed iceberg volume’ are normalized
diﬀerently in Table V compared to the others. To be comparable to the parameter of the trade
size they are normalized as multiples of the average market order volume of the individual stock.
In Tables VI and VII they are standardized (zero mean, unit standard deviation) on the sub-
sample of detected iceberg observations of the individual stock. Another diﬀerence is that in
Table V the variables are signed by side (bid volume positive, ask volume negative), whereas in
the other tables there are individual estimators for each side.
4. Due to some extreme outliers for the visible quote volume in the sample we restrict the maximum
visible volume to 25 times the average market order size (0.38% for large, 0.21% for medium,
and 0.08% for small stocks). We replace (winsorize) the visible volume for those observations
with the deﬁned maximum.
5. Negative predicted hidden volume (see above) is replaced by a zero prediction.
6. The speciﬁcation ignores that the market order size is truncated at zero. For the set of estimated
parameters no observation with predicted negative market order size is observed.
7. Table V only: For the last 30 transactions of the trading day the closing price replaces the future
mid-quote.
8. Table VII only: For the logit average marginal eﬀects are reported. For the iceberg indicators
the marginal eﬀect is reported for a change from zero to one.
Tables VIII to X
1. All remarks for Tables V to VII are still valid here.
2. Speciﬁcation of the estimated moments and the derivation of the expected proﬁt is outlined in
Appendix A2.
3. Proﬁts are calculated for units up to the 4th best quote level. The addition of the 4th level itself
contributed to the results only marginally.
4. For the calculation of ex-ante proﬁts the predicted hidden volumes are considered, ex-post the
true hidden volumes.
5. Table VIII only: Books without Icebergs include false detections of the iceberg detection algo-
rithm.
6. Table IX only: The row “Iceberg Order” only includes the iceberg orders of the best quote
(usually only one). For the calculation we track the ordering in the queue by maintaining a
separate priority list of all orders at the best quote. The visible volume of iceberg orders at
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